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1 Introduction
In two recent contributions, Gintis (2006) and Gintis (2007), Herbert Gintis
introduces agent-based imitation models (see Dawid (2007)) built upon evo-
lutionary bargaining games where agents use private prices as strategies. He
reports surprising convergence results for simulations performed in exchange
economies where goods are strict complement. In Gintis (2007), he focuses on
the Scarf economy (see Scarf (1960)) and his simulations show convergence
to equilibrium, whereas this equilibrium is well-known to be unstable for the
taˆtonnement mechanism. In Gintis (2006), he studies a variant of the Scarf
economy with Leontief preferences and corner endowments. In this setting, the
equilibrium price is completely indeterminate. Still, Gintis’ simulations show
convergence to an unique equilibrium. According to Gintis (2007), these re-
sults suggest, first that “a highly decentralised Walrasian economy, under a
wide range of plausible conditions, has a unique, stable steady state in which
the economy is reasonably close to Pareto efficient” , second that “the stabil-
ity of a market system depends on the fact that prices are private information”
and finally1 that “a major mechanism leading to convergence of economic be-
haviour is imitation in which poorly performing agents copy the behaviour of
better-performing agents.” The aim of this note is to illustrate and reinforce
these claims by studying analytically a simplified version of Gintis (2006).
The analysis is performed using the notion of stochastic stability (see the
exposition of stochastic stability in Ellisson (2000) or Peyton-Young (1993) and
references therein). Stochastic stability methods have previously been put for-
ward in dynamic models of exchanges economies as refinement tools providing
foundations for competitive outcomes (see Alos-Ferrer and Kirschteiger (2009),
Serrano and Volij (2008) and references therein). We illustrate here their poten-
tial as equilibrium selection devices. Indeed, we prove that among a completely
indeterminate set of equilibria, stochastic stability selects, as Gintis’ simula-
tions do, the equilibrium which requires the trading of the least share of initial
endowments. Minimizing the quantities traded seems a fairly appealing equilib-
rium selection mechanism: it strongly echoes the principle of minimum energy
in thermodynamics, it would be compatible with the presence of transaction cost
and implies a form of maximum stability towards rationing. This last point will
be crucial in the evolutionary selection process. The less trading an equilibrium
involves, the less welfare is affected when deviation from the terms of trade
by some agents introduce rationing. In evolutionary terms (using the concepts
put forward in Ellisson (2000)), the less trading an equilibrium involves, the
larger the number of mutations required to leave its basin of attraction. This
fact will play the key role in the proof of the stochastic stability of the least
1A third claim stating that “when even a small fraction of agents are assumed to share
the same price system and update in a coordinated manner, as suggested by the taˆtonnement
mechanism, the price system becomes highly volatile.” is not discussed here.
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trade equilibrium which is the central result of this note. The result is proved
in the economy with Leontief preferences and corner endowments studied in
Gintis (2006), but using a more stylized model for the exchange and learning
dynamics. As in Gintis (2006), agents base their exchanges on private prices
and equilibria are identified with situations where all the agents adopt the same
prices. However, we strengthen the role of private prices, taking as a reference
point a situation where agents only trade with peers using similar prices. This
simplification allows us to propose a not too involve proof, though partly at the
expense of generality. Further work could however lead to the construction of a
fairly powerful equilibrium selection device.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the characteristics
of the exchange economy considered in Gintis (2006) and summarize the results
Gintis obtains as convergence to the least trade equilibrium. In section 3, we
introduce a class of dynamics in this exchange economy based on the sequential
composition of trading, imitation and mutation processes for which we prove
that the least trade equilibrium is the only stochastically stable state. Section 4
concludes.
2 An exchange economywith strict complementar-
ity
2.1 The framework
Given an n-dimensional vector of positive elements 2 ω = (ω1, · · · , ωn) ∈ Rn++,
we consider the exchange economy, denoted by E(ω), with the following char-
acteristics.
• There are n×m agents, wherem is an arbitrary positive natural number.
• Each agent has the same utility function u : Rn+ → R defined by:
u(x1, · · · , xn) = min(x1
ω1
, · · · , xn
ωn
) (1)
• For each i = 1 · · ·n, there are exactly m agents (hereafter called the
agents of type i) which have as initial endowment ωi units of good i and
zero units of every other good. So that the total initial resources in the
economy are equal tomω.
The demand of an agent of type i at a positive price p ∈ Rn++ is given by:
di(p) := argmaxp·x≤pi·ωiu(x) =
piωi
p · wω (2)
2Notations : in the following, we shall denote by Rn+ := {x ∈ Rn | ∀i ∈ {1 · · ·n} xi ≥ 0}
the positive orthant of Rn, and by Rn++ its interior.
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and its excess demand by :
zi(p) := di(p)− ωiei = piωi
p · wω − (0, · · · , ωi, · · · , 0) (3)
One can then notice that the aggregate excess demand Z(p) =
∑n
i=1mzi(p)
vanishes at any positive price.This yields:
Proposition 1 In the economy E(ω), every price p ∈ Rn++ is an equilibrium
price.
In the following, we denote by Q the space of goods Rn+. Moreover we
consider normalized prices in the simplex S = {p ∈ Rn++ | p · ω = n}.
2.2 The minimal trading equilibrium
In order to lift part of the indeterminacy on the outcome of exchange in the
economy E(ω), Gintis considers agents characterized by private prices engaged
in three kind of processes: trading, imitation and mutation. In other words, he
studies evolutionary dynamics in a bargaining game where agents use private
prices as strategies (see Gintis (2006)).
During the trading process, each agent is engaged in a sequence of bilat-
eral trades. Starting with its initial endowment it tries to obtain via exchange
a demand it computes according to its private price. The main constraint put
forward on bilateral trades is that their value must be non-negative according to
the private prices of both contractors. The trading process itself consists in a
randomly determined sequence of bilateral trades which yields a reallocation of
the resourcesmω among the agents (see Gintis (2006) for details).
The imitation process takes place after a certain number iterations of the
trading process. It randomly implements a sequence of agent pairings during
which successful agents see their private price copied by less successful ones.
The imitation process hence entails an updating of the private prices distribution
on the basis of the utility gained during the trading process.
Finally the mutation process takes place after the imitation process. The
private prices then mutate (randomly change) with a low probability called the
mutation rate. The mutation process hence entails a random perturbation of the
price distribution.
In Gintis’ numerical experiments, the iteration of these processes entails
convergence of the economy to the equilibrium associated with the price
p¯ = (
1
ω1
, · · · , 1
ωn
) (4)
As a matter of fact, the corresponding equilibrium is the one in which the
smallest fractions of initial endowments have to be traded. Namely, one has:
Proposition 2 The price p¯ is the unique minimizer of3:
3The symbol / denotes here the division coordinatewise.
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n∑
i=1
(‖zi(p)/ω‖2)2 (5)
Proof: We are looking for the minimum over S of
φ(p) =
n∑
i=1
(
∑
j 6=i
(
p · ωj
p · ω )
2 + (
p · ωi
p · ω − 1)
2)
φ(p) = (
n∑
i=1
(
n∑
j=1
(
p · ωj
p · ω )
2) + n− 2
It is straightforward to see that this quantity is minimized when all the p ·ωj
are equal, that is if and only if the price is p¯.
Remark 1 One should note that in the preceding proposition the quantities
traded are measured in normalized units (in shares of the initial resources).
Therefore, the characterization given in proposition 2 is independent of the units
of measurement (and of the utility representation as well).
Hence, Gintis’ experiments give raise to a fairly appealing equilibrium se-
lection criterium: evolutionnary mechanisms would tend to an equilibrium sat-
isfying a minimum principle, the “least trade” equilibrium. In the following, we
aim at providing some analytical foundations for this principle using the notion
of stochastic stability (see e.g Ellisson (2000), Peyton-Young (1993)). Indeed
we shall exhibit, for a class of markovian models closely related to Gintis’ ex-
periments, sufficient conditions to ensure that the least trade equilibrium is the
only stochastically stable state.
3 A Markovian model
As put forward in Gintis (2007), Gintis’ experiments can be modeled by a
Markov chain of very large dimension. Indeed, let us restrict attention to prices
in an arbitrary finite subset of the simplex containing p¯ : P ⊂ S. Let us also
identify each agent by a pair (i, j) ∈ {1 · · ·n} × {1 · · ·m}, where i is the type
of the agent and j indexes the agents within a type. We can then represent the
state of a system where each agent is endowed with a private price in P by an
element of the finite set P n×m which we shall call a population. Gintis experi-
ments can then be apprehended as Markovian dynamics on populations.
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3.1 Trading process
Let us first focus on the trading process. In Gintis (2006), once a sequence of
bilateral trades is chosen, the allocation achieved via exchange is a function of
the private prices of the agents only. The trading sequence being chosen ran-
domly, the trading process in fact associates to a population of prices pi ∈ P n×m
a probability distribution Tpi on the set of allocations Qn×m ( for sake of techni-
cal simplicity, we shall assume that Qn×m is endowed with the Borel σ-algebra
and that Tpi has finite support). Now mechanisms representing the allocation of
goods on the basis of private prices should satisfy specific properties. In Gintis
(2006) and Gintis (2007), the adoption of a private price by an agent constrains
its demand and restricts the trades it accepts to those having positive values ac-
cording to its price. Here, aiming at a formal analysis rather than at a numerical
implementation, we shall be more concerned with the global properties of the
trading process than with the inner structure of the bargaining mechanism (in
this rerspect our approach is closer to Alos-Ferrer and Kirschteiger (2009) than
to Serrano and Volij (2008)). We shall therefore restrict further than in Gin-
tis (2006) or Gintis (2007) the set of allocation mechanisms in order to obtain
a simpler aggregate picture. In particular, we shall strengthen the role of pri-
vate prices, taking as a reference point a situation where agents only trade with
peers using the same price. This can be seen as a stylization of Gintis (2006)
but also relates to an alternative “market selection” interpretation in the spirit of
Alos-Ferrer and Kirschteiger (2009): one could consider there exists different
market institutions, each characterized by a prevailing price and interpret the
private price of an agent as indicating which market institution he has chosen to
perform his exchanges4.
4In such a framework, the evolution of the population of agents could be seen as agents
voting with their feet for a trading post.
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Let us now translate those considerations into axiomatic requirements on
the probabilistic representation of the trading process. First of all an allocation
mechanism, as such, should conserve total quantities:
∀pi ∈ P n×m Tpi{ξ ∈ Qn×m |
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
ξi,j = mω} = 1. (I)
Second a useful simplification, which can be seen as a proxy for the averaging
that would take place if the trading process was iterated several times as in Gintis
(2006), is to consider the allocation mechanism is anonymous, that is deliver the
same allocation to agents of the same type using the same prices.
∀pi ∈ P n×m ∀i ∈ {1 · · ·n}∀j, k ∈ {1 · · ·m},
pii,j = pii,k ⇒ Tpi{ξ | ξi,j = ξi,k} = 1. (II)
Now, the main restriction we put forward on the allocation to an agent is that
it satisfies the agent’s private budget constraint. This condition strictly holds
only if trade is restricted to agents using the same price as put forward above.
Nevertheless as the numbers of coexisting prices diminish, this becomes a better
approximation of the trading process a` la Gintis as “lucky” trades increasing the
value of one’s stock should become exceptional. Let us hence posit:
∀pi ∈ P n×m ∀i ∈ {1 · · ·n} ∀j ∈ {1 · · ·m}
Tpi{ξ | pii,j · (ξi,j − ωi) ≤ 0} = 1. (III)
Let us finally focus on “uniform” populations in which all agents have the
same private price. Given proposition 1, it seems a minimal requirement of
efficiency for the allocation mechanisms to then deliver the corresponding equi-
librium allocation. One could ensure this is indeed the case by assuming some
general property of efficiency for the trading process. It is much less restrictive
to simply state the property as such. Hence, denoting by υ(p) ∈ P n×m, the
population such that every agent uses p ∈ P as a private price, we shall assume:
∀i ∈ {1 · · ·n} ∀j ∈ {1 · · ·m} Tυ(p){ξ | ξi,j = di(p)} = 1 (IV)
Remark 2 Comparing our conditions to Gintis’ trading algoritm in Gintis (2006),
we remark that condition (I) is satisfied in Gintis (2006)5 ; condition (IV) ap-
proximates very well the results obtained there ; condition (II) is a less exact
approximation but is asymptotically true as the numbers of trading iterations in
Gintis (2006) increases ; finally conditions (III) (and (VIII) introduced below)
are much more stylized than Gintis algorithm and as pointed out above, closer
to a situation where agents only trade with peers using the same price.
5Gintis also considers the possibility for an agent to produce extra units of goods when it has
traded “optimally”. This additional process does not seem crucial in Gintis’ simulations. As its
embedding also fairly complicates the analysis, we do not take it into account here.
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3.2 Imitation process
The imitation process randomly associates to a population and an allocation
(via utility evaluation), a new population. In other words, it associates to a pair
(pi, ξ) ∈ P n×m×Qn×m, a discrete probability distribution I(pi,ξ) on populations.
The dynamics of populations generated by the sequential iteration of trading
and imitation are then represented by a Markov transition matrix F defining a
transition probability on the set of populations according to:
F(pi,pi′) =
∫
Qn×m
I(pi,ξ)(pi′) dTpi(ξ) (6)
In absence of noise, the asymptotic properties of the dynamics induced on
populations are usually determined by the clustering properties of the imita-
tion process (see Dawid (2007)). Indeed, let us first point out that imitation
mechanisms should not increase the variety of prices in the population. That is,
denoting s(pi) := {p ∈ P | ∃(i, j) ∈ {1 · · ·n} × {1 · · ·m} pii,j = p}, let us
posit:
∀pi ∈ P n×m ∀ξ ∈ Qn×m I(pi,ξ){pi′ | s(pi′) ⊂ s(pi)} = 1. (V)
It should then suffice that there exists a tendency towards imitation in order to
“uniformize” the price distribution. Such a tendency is commonly introduced
by considering that, typewise, poorly performing agents copy the characteristics
of successful ones (see e.g Gintis (2006), Dawid (2007)). In particular the fre-
quency of the characteristics of the most successful agents should increase. If
one assumes independent inertia in the imitation process, there should even be a
positive probability that the whole population of a given type adopts in one shot
the price of the most successful agent. However, the existence of such a leverage
effect in the imitation process would tend to minimize the influence of the trad-
ing process by giving too much weight to exceptional events (see Dawid (2007)).
Such abrupt transitions can be prevented by delaying the imitation process (as in
asynchronous learning) or by introducing further constraints, such as an invasion
threshold, on incumbent characteristics. In our framework, the fitness of a price
is in fine determined by the distribution of prices in the whole population. This
creates a feedback loop which leads to rapidly changing environmental condi-
tions. The speed of evolution should be somehow proportionate. Therefore,
we discard asynchronous learning for independent inertia though we introduce
an “invasion threshold” m the frequency of a price must reach in order to start
growing with some probability. Namely, denoting by (i′, j′) → (i, j) the event
where agent (i′, j′) adopts the price of agent (i, j), we shall first assume that for
any (pi, ξ) the events (i′, j′)→ (i, j) and (i′′, j′′)→ (i, j) are independent under
the probability I(pi,ξ). Second, we shall assume that the frequency of a price can
grow within a type only if it is above the invasion threshold. It can then grow
at the expense of prices surely yielding a lower utility than the one currently
achieved. That is to say, we compare the utility u(ξi,k) of a challenger k (of
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type i) to the maximal attainable utility ui,j(pi) = max{ξ|Tpi(ξ)>0} u(ξi,j) for the
incumbent j. Adopting such a criterion for comparing the fitness of prices will
ease considerably latter computations by preventing the need to keep track for
the whole set of agents of the utility obtained during a stochastic trading pro-
cess. It can also be interpreted as a form of resistance to change of incumbent
agents.
For sake of consistency, we also consider that prices whose frequency is
above the invasion threshold can grow at the expense of prices whose frequency
is below the invasion threshold. All together, denoting by µi(pi, p) the number
of agents of type i using price p in the population pi, we posit 6:
∀pi ∈ P n×m ∀ξ ∈ Qn×m ∀i ∈ {1 · · ·n} ∀j, k ∈ {1 · · ·m},
I(pi,ξ){(i, j)→ (i, k)} > 0
⇔
µi(pi, pii,k) ≥ m ∧ (u(ξi,k) ≥ ui,j(pi) ∨ µi(pi, pii,j) < m).
(VI)
Finally, agents should not in general copy prices used outside their type.
However, a particular case occurs when the distribution of prices is uniform
within types but distinct among types. Indeed, trading then becomes impossible.
The permanence of such a situation is highly unlikely if agents have the slightest
bit of information about other types. We shall hence assume in this case that
there is a positive probability that agents of a given type adopt the price used by
another one. Namely:
∀pi ∈ P n×m ∀ξ ∈ Qn×m ∀i, i′ ∈ {1 · · ·n}
I(pi,ξ){(i, j)→ (i′, j′)} > 0⇔
∃p, q ∈ P ∀k ∈ {1 · · ·m} µ(pii,k, p) = m ∧ µ(pii′,k, q) = m.
(VII)
Remark 3 In order to compare these conditions to the imitation algoritm in
Gintis (2006), let us underline that we have opted for independent inertia while
Gintis uses a slower learning process in between independent inertia and asyn-
chronous learning. We also have introduced condition (VII) in order to be con-
sistent with our assumptions (III) and (VIII) (see below) on the trading process.
3.3 Asymptotic dynamics without noise
As suggested above, conditions (I) to (VII) suffice to characterize the asymptotic
properties of the dynamics generated by the sequential composition of imitation
and trading processes. On the one hand, condition (V) ensures that any uniform
population (a population in which every agent uses the same private price) is
an absorbing state of Markov chains associated with F . On the other hand,
condition (VI) ensures that from every population there is a positive probability
6Condition (VI) is consistent only if
m
m
> card(P ) which we shall implicitly assume in the
following.
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to reach a population where the frequency of each price is above the invasion
threshold. Therefrom, there is a positive probability that the maximal possible
utility (pricewise) be realized and that each agent copies the corresponding price
following (VI). This would lead to a situation where the prices are uniform in
the population typewise. Condition (VII) finally ensures the possibility to then
reach an uniform population. In conclusion, from any population, there is a
positive probability of transition to an uniform population in a finite number of
periods. Also note that this number of periods can be bounded independently of
the the initial population. Denoting by U = {pi ∈ P n×m | ∃p ∈ P pi = υ(p)}
the set of uniform populations, we therefore have:
Proposition 3 For any Markov chain (Πt)t∈N on P n×m whose transition matrix
is F , we have
limt→+∞P(Πt ∈ U) = 1
where P is the probability on (P n×m)N induced by the law of Π0 and F .
3.4 Stochastic stability and equilibrium selection
The previous proposition together with condition (IV) allows us to identify the
limit set of Markov processes based on F with the equilibrium set of the econ-
omy E(ω). Still, as every price is an equilibrium price in the economy E(ω), a
lot of indeterminacy remains. Contemplating the possibility of errors in the imi-
tation process or more generally studying the sensitivity of equilibria to random
perturbations has become relatively standard in the evolutionary game theory lit-
erature under the label of stochastic stability (see Fudenberg and Levine (1998),
Kandori and al. (1993), Peyton-Young (1993)). Accordingly, Gintis comple-
ments his experiments with a mutation process where agents randomly revise
their prices. Let us then consider a mutation process (less specific than the one
implemented by Gintis) in which, given a mutation rate  > 0, the price of
each agent stays identical with probability 1−  and with probability  is drawn
anew uniformly in P . This yields a square probability transition matrixM on
P n×m whose elementM()(pi,pi′) corresponds to the probability of reaching the
price distribution pi′ from the price distribution pi. By construction this matrix is
strictly positive, its diagonal elements are equal to (1− )n×m while its element
(pi, pi′) is a polynomial in  whose non-zero term of least degree is equal to the
number of distinct prices between pi and pi′ (we shall in the following denote this
degree by c(pi, pi′)). The dynamics of populations triggered by the sequential it-
eration of trading, imitation and mutation at rate  > 0 are then represented by
the Markov transition matrix F() = M() × F . The triple (P n×m,F ,F())
then defines a model of evolution with noise in the sense of Ellisson (2000):
1. F() is ergodic for each  > 0,
2. F() is continuous in  and F0 = F ,
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3. there exists7 a function c : P n×m × P n×m → N such that for all pi, pi′ ∈
P n×m, lim→0
F()(pi,pi′)
c(pi,pi′)
exists and is strictly positive.
We are then concerned with the asymptotic properties of equilibrium selec-
tion of the model of evolution with noise (P n×m,F ,F()). Now, ergodicity of
F  implies that there exists an unique probability distribution λ() invariant for
F() towards which the law of every Markov chain associated with F() con-
verges. This implies in particular that whatever its initial state may be, a popula-
tion following the dynamics specified byF() has a limit probability of presence
in every state given by λ(). Moreover, one can check (see also Ellisson (2000))
that as  tends towards 0, λ() tends towards a probability distribution λ whose
support is included in the set of absorbing states of F , that is the set of uniform
populations. As far as the study of equilibrium selection in the economy E(ω)
is concerned, a positive result would then be that the support of λ is reduced
to a single element which could then be identified as the stochastically stable
equilibrium of E(ω). Gintis experiments suggest that the least trade equilibrium
should play this role.
Now, the characteristics of (P n×m,F ,F()) in terms of stochastic stabil-
ity will be informed by a graph whose nodes are the uniform populations and
whose edges are weighted by the number of mutations necessary to transit be-
tween two such populations with a positive probability (see e.g Peyton-Young
(1993)). We have identified uniform populations with equilibrium allocations
using condition (IV). In non-uniform populations which shall appear during a
transition , some rationing will occur (following in particular condition (III)).
The properties of the rationing schemes will condition the efficiency of prices
within mixed populations and hence determine the transition probabilities be-
tween uniform populations. In this respect,the principle put forward in Gintis
(2007) is that agents acting as sellers determine “myopically” the trades they ac-
cept on the basis of their value rather than taking strategically into account their
own demand (i.e the general rule of agreeing on a trade as long as the value
of one’s inventory increases as Gintis puts it in Gintis (2007)). This echoes the
condition of no manipulation of initial endowments implicitly present in most of
the general equilibrium literature (but the one on endowment games pioneered
by Safra, see Safra (1985)). In our framework where the evaluation of goods is
thought to be signaled by the choice of a price, this can be translated by assum-
ing that an agent can acquire as much as it can afford of the stock of agents of
other types using a similar price. That is to say agents of type i using price p
can acquire at most
µj(pi, p)
µi(pi, p)
ωj units of good j. Together with condition (III),
7This last point follows form the fact that the coefficients ofM() are polynomia in .
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this yields the following bounds on utilities attainable with some probability:
∀pi ∈ P n×m ∀p ∈ P ∀i, j ∈ {1 · · ·n} :
max{ξ|Tpi(ξ)>0} u(ξi,j) = min(u(di(pii,j)),minj=1···n(
µj(pi, pii,j)
µi(pi, pii,j)
))
(VIII)
In this setting, transitions to equilibrium prices involving little trading are com-
paratively easier. Indeed, a group of agents promoting such a transition (whose
utility at the target equilibrium is higher) has to be followed by a number of
peers of other types (whose utility at the target equilibrium is lower and who
therefore have to mutate) proportional to its excess demand. Hence the smallest
the excess demand at the target, the lowest the number of followers (mutations)
needed. In summary, the resistance of a transition is proportional to the quantity
of trading required at the target equilibrium. It is therefore harder to leave the
least-trade equilibrium for any other equilibrium than to reach it from a given
equilibrium. In the language of stochastic stability, the radius of the least trade
equilibrium is greater than its coradius. This will imply using Theorem 1 in
Ellisson (2000) that the least trade equilibrium is the only stochastically stable
equilibrium of the economy E(ω) for the dynamics given by (P n×m,F ,F()).
This is the main result of the paper which is proven in our Theorem 1 below.
Let us however first point out that the no strategic rationing condition (VIII)
is a crucial one. Indeed, if agents acting as sellers were strategically restraining
their trade in function of their demand, independently of the quantity of trading
required, a group of agents promoting a transition would have to be followed by
an equivalent numbers of peers of the other types in order to fulfill its demand.
This would prevent any distinction between equilibria in terms of stochastic
stability.
Theorem 1 For m sufficiently large, the only stochastically stable state of the
system (P n×m,F ,F()) is the uniform state associated to the least-trade equi-
librium price, υ(p¯).
Proof: Let us first mention that the fact that m is sufficiently large is used on
the one hand to ensure thatm is substantially greater thanm (e.g m≥ 3m) and
on the other hand to ensure that the inequalities we put forward below extend to
integral parts.
Let us then introduce some auxiliary definitions:
• A path from pi ∈ P n×m to pi′ ∈ P n×m is a finite sequence of states,
pi1, · · · , piK such that pi1 = pi and piK = pi′. The set of paths from pi to pi′
is denoted by S(pi, pi′). The cost of a path (pi1, · · · , piK) is defined as:
c(pi1, · · · , piK) =
K−1∑
k=1
c(pik, pik+1) (7)
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.84
One can then remark that c(pi, pi′) = 0 whenever Fpi,pi′ > 0, that is when-
ever there is a positive probability to reach pi′ from pi via the unperturbed
process and that c(pi, pi′) is bounded above by the number of distinct prices
between pi and pi′.
• The basin of attraction of an uniform state υ(p) is the set of initial states
from which the unperturbed Markov process (based on F) converges to
υ(p) with probability one, that is if one denotes by (Πt)t∈N a generic
Markov chain with transition matrix F :
D(p) = {pi ∈ Pn×m | PΠ0=pi{(Πt)t∈N | ∃T ∈ N, ΠT = υ(p)} = 1} (8)
where PΠ0=pi is the probability distribution induced by F and the initial
condition Π0 = pi.
• The radius of an uniform state υ(p) is then defined as the minimal cost of
a path leaving D(p) (i.e reaching its complement D(p)c):
r(p) = minc(s) for s ∈ ∪pi∈D(p)cS(υ(p), pi) (9)
• Finally, the coradius of an uniform state υ(p) is defined as the maximal
cost of a transition to υ(p) :
cr(p) = maxp′ 6=p mins∈S(υ(p),υ(p¯))c(s) (10)
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Now, the application of Theorem 1 in Ellisson (2000) to our framework
yields that if the radius of υ(p¯) is greater than its coradius, it is the only stochas-
tically stable of (P n×m,F ,F()). We can hence prove our Theorem 1 by show-
ing that for all p 6= p¯ :
r(p¯) > mins∈S(υ(p),υ(p¯))c(s) (11)
Let us then first consider an arbitrary price p ∈ P−{p¯} and determine an upper
bound for c(s) with s ∈ S(υ(p), υ(p¯)). As p 6= p¯, there exists i ∈ {1 · · ·n} such
that pi <
1
ωi
. According to (2) the indirect utility of the corresponding type of
agent is strictly smaller than
1
n
:
u(di(p)) =
pi · ωi
n
<
1
n
(12)
Under condition (III), this also is a bound on the utility the corresponding type
of agent can reach with some probability via the trading process. Now, let pi be
the population such thatm agents of type i andm
piωi
n
agents of type i′ 6= i use
the special price p¯ while all other agents use price p. One has:
c(ν(p), pi) = m(1 + (n− 1)piωi
n
) < m(1 +
n− 1
n
) (13)
Now, under condition (VIII), one has for the agents of type i such that pii,j = p¯ :
Tpi{ξ ∈ Qm×n | u(ξi,j) = piωi
n
} > 0 (14)
Hence agents using price p¯ achieve with some probability an utility at least
equal to the maximal utility reachable by agents using price p. According to
(VI) there then is a positive probability to reach via the imitation process a
population pi′ where all the agents of type i use price p¯ while agents of other
types use price p. That is: ∑
{pi′|µi(pi′,p¯)=m∧∀i′ 6=i µi(pi′,p)=m}
Fpi,pi′ > 0 (15)
Hence, there exists pi′ such that c(pi, pi′) = 0, µi(pi′, p¯) = m and for all i′ 6= i
µi(pi
′, p) = m. For any such pi′, it is clear, using (VII), that there exists a path
s ∈ S(pi′, υ(p¯)) such that c(s) = 0. One can then conclude that for all p ∈
P − {p¯} :
mins∈S(υ(p′),υ(p))c(s) < m(1 +
n− 1
n
) (16)
To end the proof using (11), it remains to show that form large enough:
r(p¯) ≥ m(1 + n− 1
n
). (17)
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We shall prove this by contradiction. Let us assume there exists pi 6∈ D(p¯) such
that:
c(υ(p¯), pi) < m(1 +
n− 1
n
). (18)
Now, form large enough, one has for all i ∈ {1 · · ·n} :
µi(pi, p¯) ≥ m. (19)
and according to (VIII) for all i, j such that pii,j = p¯ :
Tpi{ξ ∈ Qm×n | u(ξi,j) = u(di(p¯))} > 0 (20)
According to (VI), it must then be if pi 6∈ D(p¯) that there exists i0 and p such
that µi0(pi, p) ≥ m and that for all j such that pii0,j = p :
Tpi{ξ ∈ Qm×n | u(ξi0,j) ≥ u(di(p¯))} > 0 (21)
Now, one has for all i ∈ {1 · · ·n} u(di(p¯)) = 1
n
. Hence (21) requires:
Tpi{ξ ∈ Qm×n | u(ξi0,j) ≥
1
n
} > 0 (22)
On the other hand, (VIII) yields :
max
{ξ|Tpi(ξ)>0}
u(ξi0,j) ≤ min
j=1···n
(
µj(pi, p)
µi0(pi, p)
) (23)
For (22) and (23) to hold simultaneously, one must have for all i :
µi(pi, p)
µi0(pi, p)
≥ 1
n
. (24)
As µi0(pi, p) ≥ m, this implies for all i :
µi(pi, p) ≥ 1
n
m. (25)
And Finally:
c(υ(p¯), pi) ≥ m(1 + n− 1
n
). (26)
This contradicts (18) and ends the proof.
4 Concluding remarks
We have hence proved that evolutionnary mechanisms can select an equilibrium
in a setting with a lot of indeterminacy, according to a minimization principle
reminiscent of this of thermodynamics. However, though we hope that the eco-
nomic intuition is conserved, in particular that the role of rationing is crucial,
the demonstration we give is in some sense minimal. The axioms are chosen
as strong as possible in order to obtain the simplest proof. It is clear that fur-
ther generalizations are needed in order to obtain a truly operative equilibrium
selection mechanism.
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